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Introduction
"In ‡ation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon." Milton Friedman There are two reasons why understanding in ‡ation dynamics is important. First, in the presence of price adjustment costs, in ‡ation entails wasteful expenses for …rms and generates changes in the distribution of relative prices that do not re ‡ect changes in productivity. Second, in ‡ation a¤ects the real value of nominal assets, including money. In a market economy, the distribution of relative prices and the real value of nominal assets a¤ect the allocation of the society's resources to consumption, leisure and investment. Through its e¤ect on real goods prices and asset prices in ‡ation ultimately determines economic welfare. Public policy that aims at maximizing economic welfare thus needs to understand what drives in ‡ation and how it a¤ects the allocation of resources.
During the last …ve to ten years we have seen an enormous research e¤ort to better understand the in ‡ation process, carried out by both the academic and central bank community. The reason why this area of research has been so productive is that during recent years there has been a fruitful interaction between the modeling of in ‡ation and the search for a larger set of empirical characteristics of in ‡ation.
I …rst brie ‡y review the costs and bene…ts of with in ‡ation. That part of the paper motivates why it is justi…ed to allocate so much resources to a better understanding of the in ‡ation process.
As the motivation for a better understanding of the in ‡ation process did not change recently, that part mixes somewhat older and more recent contributions to the literature. Then I give an overview of the features of the New Keynesian model that allow to assess the size of the costs and bene…ts of in ‡ation. Subsequently, I present the features of the in ‡ation and price adjustment data that the 1 model should ideally match. Finally, I conclude and discuss some unresolved issues.
Costs and Bene…ts of In ‡ation In ‡ation and Costly Price Adjustment
Arguably price adjustment is not completely costless. There are many factors that contribute to the overall cost of price adjustment. There is for instance the labor cost of the people that decide on the price adjustment, the cost of printing new price tags, the labor cost of physically changing the price tag. Di¤erent goods have di¤erent costs of price adjustment. The costs for instance depend on the type of market where the good is sold. If the good is sold in an auction, the costs of price adjustment are likely to be lower than if the good is sold in a shop where each good carries a price tag. The literature often uses the term menu costs, referring to the printing costs restaurants incur when they change prices. But menu costs do not just comprise the costs of physically resetting prices, they also comprise the costs of reoptimizing the price. In the presence of menu costs, higher in ‡ation will entail higher total costs (or a less e¢ cient production) due to the more frequent adjustment of prices.
Due to menu costs, a lot of …rms do not reset their price in response to every small change in costs and demand. There will be a range in which they keep their price unchanged and tolerate deviations of their actual price from its optimal level. 1 This generates a change in the distribution of relative prices that does not re ‡ect changes in productivity, which entails e¢ ciency and welfare losses. This cost is often referred to as a relative price distortion. In this way, small menu costs can entail large welfare losses. Lach and Tsiddon (1992) for instance …nd evidence for Israel that 1 The mere fact that the prices of some goods continuously adjust does not imply that the cost of price adjustment is zero for these goods. The shocks to the optimal price of a good can be so large that the bene…ts of adjusting the good's price continuously outweigh the costs of price adjustment. 2 higher in ‡ation pushes prices to both tails of the relative price distribution.
On the other hand, there can also exist bene…ts of higher in ‡ation. In a world where nominal wages cannot adjust downwardly, higher in ‡ation decreases the real value of nominal wages. If due to certain shocks optimal real wages need to decrease, small or zero changes in nominal wages still entail real wage decreases that are optimal. This e¤ect is due to Tobin (1972) who stressed that in this context in ‡ation can "grease the wheels of the economy". Fagan and Messina (2008) , using a model with downward wage rigidity, conclude that for a number of European countries the optimal steady-state in ‡ation rate varies between 0 and 2%. For the United States, the estimates for the optimal rate of in ‡ation vary between 2% and 5%, depending on the data set they use.
In ‡ation and the Value of Nominal Assets
In ‡ation a¤ects the real value of nominal assets. This includes the real value of outstanding money balances. Money is a special type of asset that on top of its function as a store of value, also has a transactions function. When in ‡ation a¤ects the real value of outstanding money balances, this can a¤ect aggregate demand. In a model with perfect competition and costless price adjustment, Cooley and Hansen (1989) do not …nd signi…cant e¤ects of in ‡ation on output. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) , however, assume imperfect competition and costly price adjustment and …nd that in combination with sticky prices there are signi…cant e¤ects of changes in the money supply on output.
This illustrates how assumptions about in ‡ation dynamics and price adjustment can determine the e¤ects of monetary policy on output and welfare. It is therefore important to verify these assumptions with empirical facts, so that we can discriminate between di¤erent theories.
Another cost of in ‡ation comes from the combined role of the store of value and the transaction technology of money. As holding money is not remunerated, the e¤ective nominal interest rate 3 is zero. With positive in ‡ation, this creates an opportunity cost of holding money balances for transactions. On the other hand, money makes transactions easier. Therefore, in ‡ation determines the number of times someone goes to the bank in order to withdraw money and in such a way tries to reduce money balances. With higher average in ‡ation and nominal interest rates people will cut back money holdings as the opportunity cost increases, whereas the transaction bene…ts remain the same. This generates more trips to the bank, which explains the origin of the term shoe leather costs. In the literature this term covers all sorts of costs that are related to more cash management.
Another channel through which in ‡ation can a¤ect the aggregate economy and economic welfare is its role in generating real wealth redistributions across agents, in particular debtors and creditors. Doepke and Schneider (2006a) show that in ‡ation surprises can entail a substantial redistribution of wealth among di¤erent groups of people. From an aggregate perspective it is not clear whether this redistribution is a cost or a bene…t. This for instance depends on whether there is a wealth transfer from people that are unproductive to people that are productive and invest. Doepke and Schneider (2006b) …nd that for a zero sum redistribution shock through a surprise in in ‡ation, households react asymmetrically, mostly because borrowers are younger on average than lenders. As a result, in ‡ation generates a decrease in aggregate labor supply as well as an increase in savings. Even though in ‡ation-induced redistribution has a persistent negative e¤ect on output, it improves the weighted welfare of households.
In an economy with a role for the government and nominal government debt, surprises in in ‡ation can also create a way to levy non-distortionary taxes. Because government debt is nominal the rate of in ‡ation determines the real debt burden the government needs to …nance. In the case of an in ‡ation surprise real government debt decreases signi…cantly without distorting economic activity 4 as is the case for labor and capital taxes. In e¤ect in ‡ation can be a non-distortionary lump sum tax.
However, higher in ‡ation variability also increases risk premiums on nominal assets. See for instance De Graeve et al. (2008) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) for evidence and explanations of how higher in ‡ation variability can increase the in ‡ation risk premium that investors demand on nominal assets. One related issue is that for long-term nominal debt contracts in ‡ation a¤ects the pro…le of real debt repayments. This can for instance distort the allocation of investment in housing in a life-cycle model. Another related issue is that to hedge themselves against the risk of in ‡ation people invest relatively more in real assets compared to nominal assets that entail in ‡ation risk. This might not be welfare maximizing either.
In the case of negative in ‡ation, or de ‡ation, the real value of money increases. Holding money then gives a positive real return. This can become problematic if the optimal real interest rate should be lower than the rate of de ‡ation. In that case the nominal interest rate hits the zero lower bound, so that the central bank loses control over the real interest rate. The experience of Japan in the nineties is a classic example of how detrimental a prolonged period of de ‡ation -or of a suboptimally high real interest rate -can be for the economic performance of a country. Krugman Instead the price will be higher than the marginal cost, due to the monopoly power of an in…nite number of di¤erentiated good producers. The di¤erentiated good producers are mostly incorporated in the model using constant elasticity of substitution consumer preferences over an in…nite range of goods as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Nominal rigidities constitute a second ingredient that is often modeled using a price adjustment cost. This gives rise to nominal prices that are not adjusted continuously, which creates a constraint for …rms when they reset their prices. The combination of imperfect competition and nominal rigidities generates the short run non-neutrality of monetary policy. Money has not necessarily an explicit role in this model; it is just a unit of account.
Nevertheless, in ‡ation is a purely monetary phenomenon. It is ultimately the central bank that determines the price level and thus the in ‡ation rate. Up to today people debate about whether they should include a more explicit role for money in the model or not.
The New Keynesian model can be used to evaluate di¤erent policies, but before we can start doing this we need to remove a number of remaining uncertainties about the extent to which di¤erent frictions are important or not. The success or failure of this framework needs to be evaluated against a number of properties of both macroeconomic and microeconomic data. Until a few years ago the model was most often evaluated against macroeconomic data. This approach creates a number of observational equivalences between di¤erent microeconomic models of price adjustment. Because the welfare e¤ects crucially depend on the type of price adjustment the researcher assumes, we also need to evaluate the microeconomic implications of the model. Therefore, since the last …ve years people have increasingly studied the characteristics of microeconomic price adjustment using large micro price datasets. The next two sections give an overview of the macroeconomic and microeconomic statistical properties of the data and discuss which models are consistent with these statistical properties.
Post-War In ‡ation Dynamics
Most research on the time series properties of in ‡ation has focused on (i) the real e¤ects of monetary shocks and (ii) the degree of in ‡ation persistence in the data. The real e¤ects of monetary policy shocks are determined by the reaction of in ‡ation to a monetary policy shock. If in ‡ation reacts immediately and fully to a monetary shock, then there is little e¤ect on output. Concerning the degree of in ‡ation persistence, it has been quickly acknowledged that a simple version of the New Keynesian model does not imply much persistence in in ‡ation, even though at …rst sight that seems to be a key characteristic of in ‡ation. 2 This spurred a lot of research on versions of the New Keynesian model with frictions (e.g. habit persistence in consumption) that can generate more in ‡ation persistence. Today, there exists a widespread consensus about the existence of real e¤ects of monetary policy shocks. The consensus view about the empirical degree of in ‡ation persistence today seems to be that at the business cycle frequency it is relatively low.
Evidence on the real e¤ects of a monetary policy shock and in ‡ation persistence is not the only source of evidence that researchers use to evaluate their monetary models. In addition, there exist well-developed maximum likelihood and Bayesian methods (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007) to confront our models with the data. These approaches compare the model at the same time to di¤erent statistical properties of the data. Discussing these approaches lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Evidence from VARs
One way to evaluate the New Keynesian model's performance in matching macroeconomic statistical properties is by comparing the model's reaction to a monetary policy shock with the reaction in the data. The response to a monetary policy shock in the data can be measured by a Vector prices of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) .
Evidence on In ‡ation Persistence
In Figure 3 , I present in ‡ation data for the euro area, Germany and the United States. From eyeballing this …gure it appears that in ‡ation in the euro area and the United States is a fairly persistent process. This is also con…rmed when I compute the autocorrelation of in ‡ation for the entire sample period 1955-2007 in Table 1 . The autocorrelation coe¢ cient of in ‡ation in the United
States and the euro area is above 0.8. A common practice is to estimate a univariate autoregressive time series model and to measure persistence as the sum of the autoregressive coe¢ cients (e.g. Note: The graph shows annualized log-di¤erences of quarterly seasonally adjusted CPI. See Table 1 for the data sources.
wage rigidities (Blanchard and Galí, 2007) . For a particular calibration these frictions are able to replicate the univariate reduced form in ‡ation persistence. Importantly, this estimated persistence is a measure of unconditional in ‡ation persistence. Levin and Piger (2004) argue that the high persistence is not intrinsic. Instead, it is due to breaks in the mean of in ‡ation due to changes in the monetary policy strategy. After all, such high persistence is not present in Germany, where the central bank was granted independence much before the central banks in the United States and the rest of the euro area. To test this hypothesis, in by high, volatile and persistent in ‡ation for both the euro area and the United States. In Germany, however, this rise in average in ‡ation and persistence was much more muted than in the euro area and the United States. The volatility of in ‡ation in Germany even decreased during that period.
In the third period in ‡ation is again low and exhibits low persistence. This observation is in line with evidence that the high persistence of in ‡ation during the seventies was linked to the type of monetary policy regime in place (e.g. Benati, 2008 ). 4 The dynamics of in ‡ation went through substantial changes during the last …ve decades. 
Theoretical Assumptions
There are two main ways of introducing costly price adjustment in the New Keynesian model. A second way of introducing costly price adjustment is through explicitly assuming a cost of price adjustment that the …rm needs to pay every time it changes its price. A popular model is the menu cost model where there is a …xed cost to be paid every time the …rm adjusts its price. Because of the non-linearity this implies that it is more di¢ cult to solve the model using perturbation methods.
See, however, Dotsey et al. (1999) for an example of a menu-cost model that can be solved with a perturbation method. In this model the frequency of price adjustment is endogenous. The …rms that need the price adjustment most urgently adjust their prices …rst. This feature is also called the selection e¤ect (Golosov and Lucas, 2007) . It implies that the response of in ‡ation to a monetary shock is much faster than if the selection e¤ect were absent.
The model of Rotemberg (1982) assumes that the price adjustment cost is quadratic in the size of the price adjustment. In this model the frequency of price adjustment is 100%; there is no staggering of price adjustment. This is at odds with the micro data as I show below. However, in a …rst order approximation the model delivers the same Phillips curve as under the Calvo price adjustment. Lombardo and Vestin (2008) show how the choice for Calvo or Rotemberg pricing can a¤ect the policy prescriptions of di¤erent models.
Another theory is the one proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) . This theory assumes that prices can be reset every period, but that the …rm can only infrequently choose the optimal rate of price adjustment. Thus, information about the state of the economy is not immediately re ‡ected in price adjustment decisions. This creates a short-run impact of money on output.
All the previous models assume that agents are perfectly rational and (at least after some time)
perfectly informed. This implies that the natural rate hypothesis is respected. Output cannot be increased forever by increasing the rate of in ‡ation. One paper that proposes an alternative to the natural rate hypothesis is the paper of Akerlof et al (2000) . It argues that under low in ‡ation, price and wage setters do not fully update their decisions to their expectations. Therefore, slightly higher in ‡ation will push activity higher. As in ‡ation gets higher they argue that then agents will start updating their decisions again with in ‡ation expectations. Therefore, small deviations from the natural rate hypothesis are possible and e¢ cient in that model.
Empirical Evidence and Implications for the Theory
The body of empirical research on costly price adjustment has been growing exponentially during the last years. Usually the fact that goods prices do not change is taken as indirect evidence for costs of price adjustment. This might be true under the assumption that the optimal price changes continuously due to continuously changing costs and demand. However, it could as well be that some goods prices do not change simply because costs and demand do not change. To alleviate this identi…cation problem, there exists direct evidence on costly price adjustment. Levy et al. (1997) and Zbaracki et al. (2004) …nd direct evidence for the costs of price adjustment from a supermarket and an industrial …rm, respectively. They …nd that price adjustment costs amount to 0.7% or 1.23% of revenues. Zbaracki et al. (2004) document that the direct cost of changing prices is very low.
However, the managerial and customer costs are quite substantial. So to implement a price change a …rm needs to spend a lot of resources on organizing the price change within the …rm, and informing and explaining the price change to the customers of the …rm. The main statistic that these studies compute is the frequency of price adjustment, which ranges between 10% and 30% depending on the sample period and country. They also study the size of price adjustment and a number of other features of the price change distribution. The studies …nd infrequent price adjustment compared to perfectly competitive markets. However, prices adjust too fast to be able to match evidence from VARs on the output and in ‡ation e¤ects of a monetary policy shock in a New Keynesian model. This gives rise to yet another puzzle.
To solve this puzzle a series of papers have proposed real price rigidities (Ball and Romer, 1990).
Real rigidities refer to strategic complementarity in the price setting decision of …rms. A …rm is more reluctant to adjust its price in response to changes in the state of the economy the less other …rms adjust their prices. Di¤erent frictions can generate this strategic complementarity. One way to introduce strategic complementarity is through the preference speci…cation of Kimball (1995) .
In contrast to the traditional Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator, Kimball (1995) does not assume a constant elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand becomes a function of the relative price. A key concept is the curvature of the demand curve, which measures the price elasticity of the price elasticity. When the curvature is positive, Kimball's preferences generate a concave or "kinked" demand curve in a log price/log quantity space. A price above the level of the …rm's competitors increases the elasticity of demand for its product, so that the …rm progressively loses pro…ts from relative price increases. Conversely, a price below the level of the …rm's competitors reduces the elasticity of demand for its product, so that the …rm again progressively loses pro…ts from relative price decreases. In this way the combination of small costs to nominal price adjustment and a concave demand curve generates slow adjustment to changes in the state of the economy.
Despite its attractiveness, the literature su¤ers from a lack of empirical evidence on the curvature of a typical demand curve. Calibrations of the curvature using macroeconomic data range from below 2 to above 400. The results in using scanner data support the introduction of a kinked (concave) demand curve in a representative …rm economy, but the median degree of curvature is much lower than currently calibrated.
Another way to introduce real rigidities is by assuming a production chain. In industrialized countries, 40% of the value of a consumption good is typically generated in the distribution stage, whereas 60% of its value is generated in the production stage (Burstein et al., 2003) . This slows down aggregate price adjustment as price changes pass through the production chain. Cornille and Dossche (2008) contribute to understanding the way producer prices adjust. They document producer price adjustment using a Belgian micro price dataset. On average, 24% of prices adjust each month, with an average increase/decrease of 6%. Producer prices adjust more frequently than consumer prices, but their size of adjustment is typically smaller.
A particular feature of the micro data is that the size of price adjustment is large compared to in ‡ation. This implies that there must be large changes in relative prices. To match this fact, one needs idiosyncratic shocks to be able to generate such big price changes (Golosov and The details of price setting models raise a lot of issues because they determine the welfare costs of di¤erent policies. So it is very important to be able to compare the microeconomic implications of these models with microeconomic data. The macroeconomic data cannot deliver a …rm conclusion.
With respect to time-versus state-dependent price setting, evidence from Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and Gagnon (2008) suggests that a time-dependent model is consistent with an economy with low in ‡ation such as the United States today. However, for an economy with high in ‡ation such as Mexico during the Peso crisis of 1994, a state dependent model seems to be more useful.
A time-dependent model fails to match the increased frequency of price adjustment as in ‡ation reaches higher levels. However, Mackowiak and Smets (2008) 
Conclusion and Some Unresolved Issues
During the last …ve years there has been much interest in understanding in ‡ation and price dynamics. First, this is due to the emergence of a microfounded modeling framework with explicit optimization of agents and rational expectations. This implies that questions of central bank commitment and discretion can be analyzed in these models. Second, there is now access to new databases that signi…cantly increases the microeconomic evidence on price adjustment. In addition, there is the macroeconomic evidence from VARs (e.g. Christiano et al., 1999) and Bayesian model evaluations (Smets and Wouters, 2007) and evidence on in ‡ation persistence.
Whereas during the eighties and nineties central banks had turned away from formal analysis 5 , they are now investing more and more resources in improving the New Keynesian model as well as using it for policy analysis and forecasting (see e.g. Wouters, 2003, 2007) . Today the Swedish central bank even publishes optimal macroeconomic forecasts based on a version of the New Keynesian model (Adolfson et al., 2008) . This type of analysis is currently becoming an important tool in many other central banks.
However, there remain a number of unresolved issues. Even though the microeconomic evidence has substantially narrowed the range of models that can explain the macroeconomic facts, there remains substantial uncertainty about the right model. There is for instance the issue of how to interpret relatively frequent price adjustment in the microeconomic data and the persistent output e¤ects of a monetary policy shock. There are a number of theories that can generate real rigidity in response to a nominal shock. Some rely on strategic complementarity in the price setting decision (Kimball, 1995; Burstein and Hellwig, 2008) , other theories rely on staggered information ‡ows (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) , or optimal information processing of an idiosyncratic or aggregate source (Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) . A second issue is whether we need to take into account temporary price markdowns explicitly in our macroeconomic models. It is not yet clear how this a¤ects the aggregate dynamics and welfare. More evidence from surveying price setters might improve our understanding of price and in ‡ation dynamics, so that we can converge on one model that matches both the macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence on in ‡ation and prices.
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